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Abstract
Justification logic is a term used to identify a relatively new family of modal-like logics. There
is an established literature about propositional justification logic, but incursions on the first-order
case are scarce. In this paper we present a constant domain semantics for the first-order logic of
proofs with the Barcan Formula (FOLPb); then we prove Soundness and Completeness Theorems.
A monotonic semantics for a version of this logic without the Barcan Formula is already in the
literature, but constant domains requires substantial new machinery, which may prove useful in
other contexts as well. Although we work mainly with one system, we also indicate how to gen-
eralize these results for the quantified version of JT45, the justification counterpart of the modal
logic S5. We believe our methods are more generally applicable, but initially examining specific
cases should make the work easier to follow.
Keywords: Justification logic, first-order logic of proofs, completeness, epistemic logic.
1 Introduction
Propositional justification logics are similar to modal logics, except that instead of a modal necessity
operator  one has an infinite family of justification terms. These are built up from variables and
constants using basic operators that depend on the particular justification logic. In place of ϕ one
has t :ϕ where t is a justification term. One can think of t :ϕ epistemically, asserting that ‘t is a
justification for ϕ’. Then not only we can reason about what an agent knows but moreover we can
reason about the ground of his/her knowledge: justifications. The first justification logic LP (Logic of
Proofs) was introduced as part of a solution to a long-standing question about an arithmetic semantics
for propositional intuitionistic logic [2]. On one side, LP embeds into formal arithmetic, and on the
other side the modal logic S4 embeds into LP. For the embedding of LP into arithmetic, t:ϕ can be
understood as ‘t is a proof for ϕ’; propositional variables can be interpreted as sentences of arithmetic,
justification variables and constants can be associated with natural numbers and the basic operators
can be related to specific recursive functions. Thus t :ϕ can be translated in first-order arithmetic
as the sentence asserting that the number denoted by t is a proof of the Go¨del number of ϕ. Since
the early work, the number of justification logic, modal logic pairings has grown enormously, [9].
The connection with formal arithmetic does not extend widely, but the epistemic justification/modal
connection remains central.
In [2] the following was proved. Given an LP theorem ϕ if we just forget the justification terms and
write boxes instead we will get an S4 theorem ϕ◦; and for any S4 theorem ϕ there is a procedure r (a
realization) that enables us to replace different occurrences of boxes with specific justification terms
in order to get a LP theorem ϕr. The theorem that establishes this result is known as the Realization
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Theorem for LP. The notions are defined so that for any modal formula ϕ, (ϕr)◦ = ϕ. Realization
results started with S4 but nowadays there are Realization Theorems for an infinite family of modal
logics, [9].
A quantified version of the justification logic LP has been created, [3, 7, 8], but it has not yet
been extensively studied. In particular, justification versions of possible world models have all had
monotonic domain functions, and constant domain versions have not been considered. It is the purpose
of this paper to examine a quantified version of LP with a justification counterpart of the Barcan
Formula. An axiomatic system together with a constant domain semantics is presented. Soundness
and Completeness are established. We also show how to extend the results obtained to the quantified
version of justification logic JT45, the justification counterpart of S5. We believe our work will extend
to other quantified justification logics having the Barcan Formula as an axiom, but here we confine
ourselves to very concrete instances. Also, we do not consider corresponding Realization Theorems
here, though this will be central to further work.
2 FOLPb: Language and axiom system
Above we mentioned two informal interpretations of justification formulas, one epistemic, the other
related to formal proofs. It is the second that provides the best motivation for the machinery of first-
order justification logics. Recall, in the propositional case we use t:ϕ to, informally, denote that t is
a derivation of ϕ. When we move to first-order we need to take individual variables into account. In
a first-order derivation, free variables play two roles: a variable can be a formal symbol that can be
subject to generalization, or it can be a place-holder that can be substituted for. These two roles are
not compatible with each other, and distinguishing between them is actually the key to the fact that
first-order justification logic can internalize its own proofs, a fundamental and essential property. We
will see formulas of the form t:Xϕ where X is a set of individual variables. Informally we can think
of this as expressing that the variables occurring in X have the role of place-holders in the derivation
t of ϕ, while variables not in X can be universally generalized. This informal motivation will appear
only incidentally in this paper, but it is important to be aware of it in order to understand the design
of first-order justification logic. In this new scenario we will deal with formulas such as t:{x}ϕ(x). The
role of {x} in t:{x}ϕ(x) is to indicate that x is free throughout the derivation t of ϕ(x), and so if e is
an individual term of the language and we substitute e for x in t we will obtain a derivation s of ϕ(e).
Definition 2.1 (Basic vocabulary). The symbols used to formulate the language of first-order
justification logic have a familiar part common to classical first-order logic, and a part specifically
related to justifications. The classical part consists of individual variables x0, x1, x2, . . . ; predicate
variables of all arities, P, Q, P ′, Q′, . . . ; and the logical operations →, ⊥, ∀. Other operations are
understood as defined, and will be used as needed. As in the LP propositional case we have justification
variables p0, p1, p2, . . . , justification constants c0, c1, c2, . . . and the operators +, ·, !. What is new
for the first-order case is that for every individual variable x a new operator genx is added; and for
every finite set of individual variables X we add the constructor (·) :X (·). This was introduced in [3].
Here we add a new justification term b(·). It will play a role in the formulation of the Barcan Formula
in justification logic. When working with constant domain first-order LP b will be a primitive symbol;
but when we move to first-order JT45 this symbol will be replaced with an expression defined from
the other formal machinery of justification terms.
Definition 2.2 (Language). The language of constant domain first-order LP consists of the set
TermJ of justification terms t and of the set FmlJ of formulas ϕ, formed by the following grammar in
which X is a finite set of individual variables:
t ::= pi | c | (t · t) | (t+ t) | !t | b(t) | genx(t) ,
ϕ ::= Px1 . . . xn | ⊥ | (ϕ→ ϕ) | ∀xϕ | t:Xϕ .
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We are assuming that the set of individual variables, justification variables and justification con-
stants are all countable sets. Then, both TermJ and FmlJ are countable sets.
Definition 2.3 (Free Variable Occurrence). Free variable occurrences are defined recursively as
usual, but with one new clause. The free variable occurrences of t:Xψ, are those of ψ, provided the
variables also occur in X , together with all occurrences in X itself. We will use fv(ϕ) to denote the
set of free variables of ϕ. Hence, by the definition of free variable occurrence, fv(t:Xϕ) = X .
Definition 2.4 (Substitution). We define the notion of an individual variable y being free for x in
the formula ϕ. The definition is the same as in the classical case, with the addition of the following
clause: y is free for x in t:Xϕ if two conditions are met, i) y is free for x in ϕ, ii) if y ∈ fv(ϕ), then
y ∈ X .
For a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and individual variables y1, . . . , yn such that yi is free for xi in ϕ, we
write ϕ(y1/x1, . . . , yn/xn) to denote the formula obtained by substitution of y1, . . . , yn for all the free
occurrences of x1, . . . , xn in ϕ, respectively. When it is clear from the context which variables are
being substituted for in ϕ we will simply write ϕ(y1, . . . , yn).
We adopt some useful notational conventions concerning finite sets of individual variables. We
write Xy instead of X ∪ {y}, and we assume that y /∈ X . We use t:ϕ as an abbreviation for t:∅ϕ.
Definition 2.5 (Basic axiom system). We begin with an auxiliary axiom system called FOLPb0
that can be found in Figure 1.
A1 Classical axioms of first-order logic
A2 t:Xyϕ→ t:Xϕ, provided y does not occur free in ϕ
A3 t:Xϕ→ t:Xyϕ
B1 t:Xϕ→ ϕ
B2 t:X(ϕ→ ψ)→ (s:Xϕ→ [t · s]:Xψ)
B3 t:Xϕ→ [t+ s]:Xϕ, s:Xϕ→ [t+ s]:Xϕ
B4 t:Xϕ→!t:X t:Xϕ
B5 t:Xϕ→ genx(t):X∀xϕ, provided x /∈ X
Bb ∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ b(t):X∀yϕ(y)
R1 (Modus ponens) ⊢ ϕ, ⊢ ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ⊢ ψ
R2 (Generalization) ⊢ ϕ⇒ ⊢ ∀xϕ
Figure 1: Axioms schemes and inference rules of FOLPb0.
There is no necessitation rule given in Figure 1. A necessitation rule can be derived using the
machinery of constant specifications, which we discuss next. The idea is, axioms are not further
analyzed and are simply (and arbitrarily) assigned constants that represent justifications for them.
Details may depend, for instance, on what axioms for classical logic are chosen for A1 in Figure 1.
Definition 2.6 (Constant specification). A set CS ⊆ FmlJ is called a constant specification if
every member of CS is of the form c:ψ, where ψ is an axiom and c is a constant. We say that CS is
axiomatically appropriate, if for every axiom ψ there is a constant c such that c:ψ ∈ CS.
Definition 2.7 (FOLPb). The subscript 0 in the name FOLPb0 is intended to tell us this axiom
system has an empty constant specification. We write FOLPbCS to denote the axiom system that
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extends FOLPb0 by adding the formulas from CS as new axioms. By constant domain first-order LP
(FOLPb) we mean the family of axiom systems FOLPbCS where CS is a constant specification. The
notion of derivation, Γ ⊢ ϕ, is defined as usual — it must be noted that, if Γ deduces ϕ using the
generalization rule, then this rule was not applied to a variable that occurs free in the formulas of Γ.
We use Γ ⊢CS ϕ to indicate that ϕ is provable in FOLPbCS by assuming Γ.
The axiom Bb is a justification analog of the Barcan formula. This axiom is indeed independent
of the other ones, by the following argument. By [3] FOLP is a counterpart of FOS4, thus if every
instance of the axiom Bb were provable in FOLP, then every instance of the Barcan formula would be
provable in FOS4; and this is not the case.
Lemma 2.8 (Deduction). For every constant specification CS,
Γ, ϕ ⊢CS ψ iff Γ ⊢CS ϕ→ ψ .
And now, the result that takes the place of a primitive necessitation rule.
Theorem 2.9 (Internalization). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification;
p0, . . . , pk be justification variables; X0, . . . , Xk be finite sets of individual variables, and X = X0 ∪
. . . ∪ Xk. If p0 :X0ϕ0, . . . , pk :Xkϕk ⊢CS ψ, then there is a justification term t(p0, . . . , pk) ∈ TermJ
such that p0:X0ϕ0, . . . , pk:Xkϕk ⊢CS t:Xψ.
Proof. The same proof as presented in [3, p. 7]. 
Theorem 2.10 (Converse Barcan and Buridan). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant
specification and y be an individual variable. For every finite set of individual variables X such that
y /∈ X, every formula ϕ(y), and every justification term t, there are justification terms f(t) and s(t)
such that:
1. ⊢CS t:X∀yϕ(y)→ ∀yf(t):Xyϕ(y) .
2. ⊢CS ∃yt:Xyϕ(y)→ s(t):X∃yϕ(y) .
Item 1 is the explicit counterpart of the converse Barcan Formula; item 2 is the explicit counterpart of
the converse Buridan Formula.
Proof. First, the derivation of the explicit converse Barcan formula.
1. ∀yϕ(y)→ ϕ(y) classical axiom.
2. c1:(∀yϕ(y)→ ϕ(y)) constant specification.
3. c1:Xy(∀yϕ(y)→ ϕ(y)) from 2 by A3.
4. c1:Xy(∀yϕ(y)→ ϕ(y))→ (t:Xy∀yϕ(y)→ [c1 · t]:Xyϕ(y)) B2.
5. t:Xy∀yϕ(y)→ [c1 · t]:Xyϕ(y) from 4 using modus ponens.
6. t:X∀yϕ(y)→ t:Xy∀yϕ(y) A3.
7. t:X∀yϕ(y)→ [c1 · t]:Xyϕ(y) from 5 and 6.
8. ∀y(t:X∀yϕ(y)→ [c1 · t]:Xyϕ(y)) generalization.
9. t:X∀yϕ(y)→ ∀y[c1 · t]:Xyϕ(y) y /∈ X and classical reasoning.
Next the explicit converse Buridan Formula.
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1. ∀y(ϕ(y)→ ∃yϕ(y)) classical validity.
2. r:∀y(ϕ(y)→ ∃yϕ(y)) using internalization.
3. r:X∀y(ϕ(y)→ ∃yϕ(y)) from 2 by A3.
4. ∀yf(r):Xy(ϕ(y)→ ∃yϕ(y)) from 3 using conv. Barcan.
5. f(r):Xy(ϕ(y)→ ∃yϕ(y)) from 4 and classical axioms.
6. t:Xyϕ(y)→ [f(r) · t]:Xy∃yϕ(y) from 5 using B2.
7. [f(r) · t]:Xy∃yϕ(y)→ [f(r) · t]:X∃yϕ(y) A2.
8. t:Xyϕ(y)→ [f(r) · t]:X∃yϕ(y) from 6 and 7.
9. ∀y(t:Xyϕ(y)→ [f(r) · t]:X∃yϕ(y)) generalization.
10. ∃yt:Xyϕ(y)→ [f(r) · t]:X∃yϕ(y) y /∈ X and classical reasoning.

As the reader can see, the terms f and s constructed above depend not only on t but also on the
formula ϕ and the constant specification CS being considered. For simplicity’s sake, we decided to
suppress some details in the notation. Also it should be noted that axiom Bb was not used in these
proofs.
3 Semantics
In propositional modal logic one uses the notion of frame. In the quantified case we have the analogous
notion of skeleton. Skeletons are also used in the semantics of first-order justification logic.
Definition 3.1 (Skeleton). A skeleton is a triple 〈W ,R,D〉, where W 6= ∅, R ⊆ W ×W and D is a
non-empty set, the domain of the skeleton.1 Given a skeleton 〈W ,R,D〉, we call it an FOLPb-skeleton
if R is a reflexive and transitive relation on W . Similarly, we call it an FOJT45-skeleton if R is an
equivalence relation.
Conventions and Notation For the rest of the paper we will use ~x, ~y, ~z, . . . as finite sequences or
vectors of individual variables where the length can be inferred from context. Likewise we write ~a, ~b, ~c,
. . . for vectors of members of the domain D of a model (c is also used to denote a justification constant;
the two distinct uses of this symbol will be clear from context). For the sake of simplicity, if ~a is a
n-uple of elements of D we will write ‘~a ∈ D’ instead of ~a ∈ Dn. In the same manner, we will write
‘{~a}’ instead of ‘{a1, . . . , an}’. As before, for a formula ϕ(~x) and domain members ~a, we use ϕ(~a) as a
shorthand for the obvious substitution. For term t and ~x = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 we will write ‘gen~x(t)’ to
abbreviate the term ‘genx1(genx2 . . . (genxn(t)) . . .)’.
Ordinarily in dealing with models one uses valuations, mapping variables to members of some
domain D. Thus one talks about the behavior of a formula ϕ with respect to valuation v. In this paper
things are already somewhat complicated, so we follow a common procedure of allowing members of
the domain D to appear directly in formulas as if they were variables—we call such things D formulas.
Technically the result is not a formula, but any assertion about it can easily be rephrased using proper
formulas and valuations.
1Since we will be working with constant domain models only we do not need to consider different domains associated
to each world w ∈ W , so D will be always a set and not a function.
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Definition 3.2 (D-formulas). Let D be a non-empty set. If ~x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 is a vector of variables,
~d = 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 is a vector of members of domain D, and ϕ(~x) is a formula, we write ϕ(~d) for what
we call a D formula that results by having di in place of each free occurrence of xi, i = 1, . . . , n,
Definition 2.3. We use D-FmlJ for the set of all D-formulas. Free individual variables can occur in D
formulas. For a D-formula ϕ, we say that ϕ is closed if ϕ has no individual free variable occurrences,
though it may contain members of D.
We emphasize that the use of D formulas can easily be replaced with valuations. It is simply a
notational convenience. Thus for ~x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 a vector of variables, ~d = 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 a vector of
members of domain D, and ϕ(~x) a formula, instead of speaking about the D formula ϕ(~d) we could
speak about ϕ(~x) with respect to the valuation v that is such that v(xi) = di. These conventions were
also used in [8]. Note that while domain members in D formulas have some of the aspects of individual
variables, they are never quantified and do not appear as subscripts of gen.
Here is an illustrative example (consulting Definition 2.3 may be useful). Suppose the setD contains
a, b, c, and d, and possibly other things. Suppose valuation v is such that v(x) = a, v(y) = b, v(z) = c,
and v(w) = d. And suppose P is a three-place predicate symbol. Then P (x, z, w), considered with
respect to v, would be written simply as P (a, c, d), and t:{x,y}P (x, z, w), considered with respect to v,
would be written t:{a,b}P (a, z, w), since z and w are not free in t:{x,y}P (x, z, w) while x and y are.
In Section 2 we discussed the informal meaning of variables occurring in a subscript set: t:{x}ϕ(x)
says that x is free throughout the derivation t of ϕ(x). This understanding carries over to D formulas
quite naturally. For a domain constant a, t(a) informally is a derivation of ϕ(a) and, since a is a
domain constant, it is not subjected to generalization. The effect is that it must behave like a free
occurrence throughout the derivation t(a) of ϕ(a).
Definition 3.3 (Fitting models). A Fitting model is a structure M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 with the
following constituents and terminology. 〈W ,R,D〉 is a skeleton; we refer to D as the domain of the
model, and similarly for W and R. I is an interpretation function, assigning to each n-ary relational
symbol P and each possible world w an n-ary relation I(P,w) on D. E is an evidence function; for
any justification term t and D-formula ϕ, E(t, ϕ) ⊆ W .
The standard informal understanding of evidence functions is: E(t, ϕ) is the set of possible worlds
at which t can be considered to be relevant (not necessarily correct) evidence for ϕ.
Definition 3.4 (Evidence function conditions). LetM = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a Fitting model. We
require the evidence function to meet the following conditions:
· Condition E(t, ϕ→ ψ) ∩ E(s, ϕ) ⊆ E([t · s], ψ).
+ Condition E(s, ϕ) ∪ E(t, ϕ) ⊆ E([s+ t], ϕ).
! Condition E(t, ϕ) ⊆ E(!t, t:Xϕ), where X is a set of members of D including those occurring
in ϕ.
R Closure Condition If w ∈ E(t, ϕ) and wRw′, then w′ ∈ E(t, ϕ).
Instantiation Condition If w ∈ E(t, ϕ(x)) and a ∈ D, then w ∈ E(t, ϕ(a)).
genx Condition E(t, ϕ) ⊆ E(genx(t), ∀xϕ).
b Condition If for every a ∈ D we have that w ∈ E(t, ϕ(a)), then w ∈ E(b(t), ∀yϕ(y)).
We say that a model M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 meets constant specification CS iff whenever c:ϕ ∈ CS,
then E(c, ϕ) =W .
The evidence function conditions reflect the axioms of FOLPb into the structure of the skeleton.
The instantiation condition codifies the axiom A3. And as the name suggests, the b Condition reflects
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the Bb axiom. Although the b and the genx conditions have a somewhat similar form, they have a
very different meaning. Recalling the provability reading of justification statements, we can read the
axiom B5 as follows: if t is a derivation of ϕ(x) in which x is not free, then genx(t) is a derivation of
∀xϕ; informally we extend the derivation t of ϕ(x) with one application of the generalization rule to
get a derivation genx(t) of ∀xϕ. But axiom Bb express a different idea. Fix a domain D. Let t(x)
be a derivation and ϕ(x) a formula. If for every a ∈ D, t(a) is a derivation of ϕ(a), then b(t) is a
derivation of ∀xϕ. This axiom embodies a kind of infinitary inference rule resembling the ω-rule. In a
first-order language expanded with a new set of constants {aξ | ξ < κ} (where κ = |D|) this rule can be
formulated as follows: ⊢ ϕ(aξ) for every ξ < κ ⇒ ⊢ ∀xϕ(x). On the one hand the justification term
genx captures the introduction of the universal quantifier via the generalization rule. On the other
hand, the new justification term b internalizes the introduction of the universal quantification via an
infinitary inference rule, an ω-rule.
Definition 3.5 (Truth at words). Let M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a Fitting model, ϕ a closed D-
formula and w ∈ W . The notion that ϕ is true at world w of M, in symbols M, w  ϕ, is defined
recursively as follows:
• M, w  P (~a) iff ~a ∈ I(P,w).
• M, w 6 ⊥.
• M, w  ψ → θ iff M, w 6 ψ or M, w  θ.
• M, w  ∀xψ(x) iff for every a ∈ D, M, w  ψ(a).
• Assume t:Xψ(~x) is closed and ~x are all the free variables of ψ. Then, M, w  t:Xψ(~x) iff
(a) w ∈ E(t, ψ(~x)) and
(b) for every w′ ∈ W such that wRw′, M, w′  ψ(~a) for every ~a ∈ D.
The definition above covers only closed formulas that can contain members of D. The following is
what we finally are interested in, validity for formulas that can contain free variables but no members
of D.
Definition 3.6 (Validity). Let ϕ ∈ FmlJ be a closed formula. We say that ϕ is valid in the Fitting
model M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 provided for every w ∈ W , M, w  ϕ. A formula with free individual
variables is valid if its universal closure is valid.
Definition 3.7 (Fitting model for FOLPb). A Fitting model for FOLPb is a Fitting model M =
〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 where 〈W ,R,D〉 is an FOLPb-skeleton.
For a formula ϕ and constant specification CS, we write CS ϕ if ϕ is valid in M for every Fitting
model for FOLPb M meeting CS.
4 Soundness
We prove soundness with respect to an arbitrary constant specification. Completeness, shown in
Section 8, will be a narrower result, requiring axiomatic appropriateness.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness). Let CS be a constant specification. For every formula ϕ ∈ FmlJ , if
⊢CS ϕ, then CS ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on proof length. The argument is almost the same as presented in [8].
In that paper, the case for the B4 axiom is not properly proved. We will show validity for the B4
axiom, and also for the axiom Bb.
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Suppose ϕ is a representative special case of B4; take ϕ to be t:{x,z}ψ(x, y)→!t:{x,z}t:{x,z}ψ(x, y).
Let M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a Fitting model for FOLPb meeting CS with w ∈ W arbitrary. We show
the universal closure of ϕ is true at w and, since x and y have free occurrences but z does not, it is
enough to show t:{a,b}ψ(a, y)→!t:{a,b}t:{a,b}ψ(a, y) is true at w for arbitrary a, b ∈ D.
Assume M, w  t : {a,b}ψ(a, y). Then we must have w ∈ E(t, ψ(a, y)), so by the ! Condition,
w ∈ E(!t, t:{a,b}ψ(a, y)). Now let v and u be arbitrary members of D with wRv and vRu. By the
transitivity of R, wRu. Since M, w  t:{a,b}ψ(a, y), we have that M, u  ψ(a, d) for every d ∈ D.
Also w ∈ E(t, ψ(a, y)) so by the R Closure Condition, v ∈ E(t, ψ(a, y)). Then, since u is arbitrary,
M, v  t:{a,b}ψ(a, y). And since the choice of v was arbitrary, M, w !t:{a,b}t:{a,b}ψ(a, y).
Next, suppose ϕ is an instance of Bb, say ϕ is ∀yt:Xyψ(y) → b(t):X∀yψ(y), and for simplicity
assume X = {x} and ψ = ψ(x, y), so our particular instance is ∀yt:{x,y}ψ(x, y) → b(t):{x}∀yψ(x, y).
We show validity of its universal closure. Let M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a Fitting model for FOLPb
meeting CS, let w ∈ W be arbitrary, and let a ∈ D be arbitrary. Assume M, w  ∀yt:{a,y}ψ(a, y); we
show M, w  b(t):{a}∀yψ(a, y)
By our assumption, M, w  t:{a,b}ψ(a, b) for every b ∈ D. Then w ∈ E(t, ψ(a, b)) for every b ∈ D,
so by the b Condition, w ∈ E(b(t), ∀yψ(a, y)). Now let v ∈ W be arbitrary such that wRv. Since
for every b ∈ D we have M, w  t : {a,b}ψ(a, b), then M, v  ψ(a, b) for every b ∈ D, and hence
M, v  ∀yψ(a, y). Since v was arbitrary,M, w  b(t):{a}∀yψ(a, y). 
5 Language Extension
In order to prove a Completeness Theorem, in Sections 7 and 8 we will construct a canonical model
using a Henkin style argument. As in Section 3 we allow additional things to appear in formulas, but
now they come from a new countable set of variables V that we call ‘witness variables’. These witness
variables can appear in formulas, but are never quantified and do not appear as subscripts on gen.
This way of extending the language has some differences from the one presented in [8]. Although here
we are using a new type of variable, it essentially has a role similar to a domain constant. It is made
a variable partly to help with readability, since we also work with justification constants.
From now on we use the phrase individual variables to denote the members of V ∪ {x0, x1, . . . },
basic variables to denote the members of {x0, x1, . . . }, our original variables, and witness variables to
denote the newly added members of V. In typical Henkin style we are interested in taking V to be
the domain D of the canonical model we will construct, so for the course of the completeness proof we
will call a Henkin formula a first-order justification formula in which basic variables may occur free or
bound, but variables from V may only occur free (a Henkin formula is just a D-formula when D = V).
Symbolically we write FmlJ(V) for this language. The set of justification terms is not enarged since
witness variables do not appear as subscripts on gen, so both FmlJ and FmlJ(V) have TermJ as their
set of justification terms. We call a Henkin formula closed if no basic variable occurrences are free.
Using this enlarged language we construct a new axiomatic system for FOLPb based on the formulas
from FmlJ(V). By basic system we mean the language and the axiomatic system presented earlier,
without the extension to Henkin formulas.
Definition 5.1 (Variable variants). Two Henkin formulas are variable variants provided each can
be turned into the other by a renaming of free individual variables. In other words, there is a 1-1, onto
map from the free variables of one formula to the feee variables of the other.
We will be interested in variable variants within the basic language, and also in the language with
witness variables added. In either case, this does not concern quantified variables or those that appear
as gen subscripts.
Definition 5.2 (Variant closed). A constant specification CS is variant closed iff whenever ϕ and
ψ are variable variants, then c:ϕ ∈ CS iff c:ψ ∈ CS.
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Definition 5.3. Let CS be a variant closed constant specification for the basic system. By CS(V)
we mean the smallest set satisfying the condition: If c:ϕ ∈ CS, ψ ∈ FmlJ (V) and ψ is the result of
replacing some free basic variables in ϕ with distinct witness variables, then c:ψ ∈ CS(V) (In other
words, ψ is a variable variant of ϕ but in the language allowing witness variables).
There are several items concerning this that are easy to establish, but are fundamental.
Proposition 5.4. Assume CS is a variant closed constant specification for the basic system.
1. CS ⊆ CS(V).
2. CS(V) is variant closed.
3. If CS is axiomatically appropriate with respect to FmlJ , then CS(V) is axiomatically appropriate
with respect to FmlJ(V).
4. If c:ψ ∈ CS(V) and ψ contains no witness variables, then c:ψ ∈ CS.
5. The Deduction Lemma 2.8, the Internalization Theorem 2.9, and Theorem 2.10 hold for the
enlarged axiom system allowing witness variables.
Proof. We take them in order.
1. In constructing CS(V), identity replacement of basic variables is allowed.
2. Suppose c:ψ1 ∈ CS(V) and ψ1 and ψ2 are variable variants, allowing witness variables. Since
c:ψ1 ∈ CS(V), there is some ϕ in the basic language that is a variable variant of ψ1 with c:ϕ ∈ CS.
Since composition of 1-1, onto maps is 1-1 and onto, ψ2 and ϕ are variable variants, and hence
c:ψ2 ∈ CS(V).
3. Our axiomatization is by schemes.
4. Assume c:ψ ∈ CS(V), where ψ is in the basic language. There must be some c:ϕ ∈ CS where ϕ
and ψ are variable variants. Then c:ψ ∈ CS since CS is variant closed.
5. We omit the arguments.

The next Proposition has some corollaries that are important in our completeness proof.
Proposition 5.5. Assume the following.
1. CS is a variant closed constant specification for the basic system and CS(V) is its extension to
FmlJ(V).
2. ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn is an FOLPb proof in the language of FmlJ (V) using CS(V).
3. a is a witness variable that occurs in the proof.
4. y is a basic variable that does not occur in the proof (free, bound, or as a subscript of gen).
5. (ψi)
− is the result of replacing a with y.
Then (ψ1)
−, (ψ2)
−, . . . , (ψn)
− is also a proof.
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Proof. The argument is by induction on proof step.
If ψi is an axiom, since we are using axiom schemes and y is new, then (ψi)
− is also an axiom.
Suppose ψi is a member of CS(V). Then it is of the form c:φ, and (ψi)− is c:(φ)− where (φ)− is
the result of replacing a by y in φ. Since φ and (φ)− will be variable variants, c:(φ)− ∈ CS(V) since it
is variant closed.
If ψi is deduced from ψi1 and ψi2 = ψi1 → ψi by modus ponens, then (ψi2)
− is (ψi1)
− → (ψi)−.
So (ψi)
− also follows from (ψi2 )
− and (ψi1 )
− by modus ponens.
If ψi is deduced from ψl by generalization, then ψi is ∀xψl, where x muxt be a basic variable since
witness variables are not quantified. Then ∀x(ψl)− is also deduced from (ψl)− by generalization, since
y is new and hence does not affect x. 
Corollary 5.6 (Conservativity). Let CS be a variant closed constant specification for the basic
system and CS(V) be its extension to FmlJ (V). For every ϕ ∈ FmlJ , if ⊢CS(V) ϕ, then ⊢CS ϕ.
Proof. If ⊢CS(V) ϕ, then ϕ has a proof that may contain witness variables. One by one, replace these
with new basic variables. Using Proposition 5.5, the result must be a proof, and will contain no witness
variables. By item 4 of Proposition 5.4, this will be a proof using constant specification CS, and since
ϕ contained no witness variables, their replacement does not affect it. Hence there is a proof of ϕ using
CS. 
Corollary 5.7 (Generalization). Suppose CS is a variant closed constant specification for the basic
language and CS(V) is its extension. Let ϕ(a) be a formula containing witness variable a (and possibly
other witness variables). If ⊢CS(V) ϕ(a) then for some new basic variable y, ⊢CS(V) ∀yϕ(y).
Proof. Assume ⊢CS(V) ϕ(a), so it has a proof in the language FmlJ(V). Let y be any basic variable
that does not occur in the proof, and replace occurrences of a throughout that proof with occurrences
of y. By Proposition 5.5, this will still be a proof, but of ϕ(y). Now Generalization can be applied,
Rule R2 from Figure 1, and ∀yϕ(y) is provable. 
Definition 5.8. Let CS be a variant closed constant specification for the basic language and let
Γ ⊆ FmlJ . We say that Γ is CS-inconsistent iff Γ ⊢CS ⊥. By the Deduction Lemma 2.8, Γ is CS-
inconsistent iff there is a finite subset {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of Γ such that ⊢CS (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn)→ ⊥. A set Γ
is CS-consistent if it is not CS-inconsistent. And we say that Γ is CS-maximally consistent whenever
Γ is CS-consistent and Γ has no proper extension that is CS-consistent. There are similar notions for
CS(V).
It follows from Corollary 5.6 that for every set of basic formulas Γ, if Γ is CS-consistent, then Γ is
CS(V)-consistent.
Proposition 5.9 (Lindenbaum). Let CS be a variant closed constant specification and CS(V) its
extension. If Γ ⊆ FmlJ (V) is CS(V)-consistent then there is a Γ
′ ⊆ FmlJ(V) such that Γ ⊆ Γ
′ and
Γ′ is a CS(V)-maximally consistent set.
6 Templates
Starting with Section 7 we will prove completeness for FOLPb with respect to a justification logic
analog of constant domain Kripke models for S4. For this we follow the general outline of the constant
domain completeness proof in [10], but complexities arise in transferring the proof from a modal setting
to a justification logic one. The modal completeness argument makes much use of finite sets of modal
formulas. This is important because a finite set of formulas acts like its conjunction — a single formula.
But if modal operators in a finite set of formulas are replaced with justification terms, an infinite set
can result. There is only one necessity operator, but there are infinitely many justification terms
that can replace it. Somehow finiteness must be restored for a completeness argument to go through.
The key idea is that justification formulas having the same underlying propositional modal structure
10
can be grouped together. We introduce the notion of template as a way of making precise what we
need about the modal structure of justification formulas. Formal details follow after some motivating
informal remarks.
Consider the modal formula (p ∧ ψ), where p is a propositional letter. In any normal modal
logic, if ϕ→ ψ is provable then (p∧ϕ)→ (p∧ψ) will also be provable. The only strictly modal
tools needed for this are the rule of necessitation and the K axiom. But now consider a justification
logic analog of (p ∧ ψ), say t:(p ∧ u:ψ). It is not the case that if ϕ → ψ is provable in LP, so is
t:(p ∧ u:ϕ)→ t:(p ∧ u:ψ), but one can easily show that the following is provable,
t:(p ∧ u:ϕ)→ [s2 · t]:(p ∧ [s1 · u]:ψ) . (1)
Here s1 is a justification term such that s1 : (ϕ → ψ) is provable, provided by the Internalization
Theorem 2.9, and similarly s2 is a justification term such that s2 : ((p ∧ u :ϕ) → (p ∧ [s1 · u] :ψ))
is provable, again provided by the Internalization Theorem. This is considered in much detail in [5],
where algorithms are given to compute justification terms involved in such formula manipulations. But
for purposes of the present paper we observe the following key fact about (1): both the antecedent and
the consequent have the same general form. More specifically, both have the form of (p ∧q), with
different justification terms replacing the necessity operator. We call an expression like (p ∧ q)
a template and we work with the family of substitution instances of templates, rather than with
individual formulas.
Here is another way of looking at the need for templates. In moving from modal to justification
logics we can understand the usual modal operator to be something like an existential quantifier over
justification terms (this was made precise and formal in [6]). Then asserting ϕ is akin to asserting
t:ϕ for some justification term t, and asserting ¬ϕ is like asserting ¬t:ϕ for every justification term t.
Both of these are infinitary in nature. In the conventional modal setting one talks about Γ ∪ {¬ϕ}
being consistent, for a set Γ and formula ϕ. The analog in the justification logic setting is talk of the
consistency of Γ ∪ {¬t1:ϕ, ¬t2:ϕ, . . . } where t1, t2, . . . are all the justification terms. Templates are
what we use for this — we talk about the consistency of Γ together with all ‘instances’ of ¬ϕ.
Definition 6.1 (Template). Let p1, . . . , pn be distinct propositional letters. A template on these
letters is a propositional modal formula that is built up from p1, . . . , pn with ¬,∨ and ∧ as connectives,
with  as the only modal operator, and with no pi occurring more than once. We write F (p1, . . . ,pn)
to indicate a template in which the propositional letters are among p1, . . . ,pn. We write ~p to denote
a sequence of propositional variables, so F (p1, . . . ,pn) may appear as F (~p).
We emphasize that a template is a propositional modal formula, and not a formula of FOLPb and
hence has no individual variables, quantifiers, or first-order relation symbols. Just as when we work
with formulas, we can define the notion of degree of a template as the number of occurrences of boolean
connectives and modal operators). Then we can define some notions recursively based on the degree
of templates and prove corresponding facts by induction on the degree of templates.
We next define instantiation sets for templates; these are sets of first-order formulas, Henkin for-
mulas as discussed in Section 5.
Definition 6.2 (Instantiation sets). Let ~p be an n-ary sequence of distinct propositional variables,
~ϕ be an n-ary sequence of Henkin formulas (not necessarily distinct) and F (~p) a template. We define
the instantiation set JF (~ϕ)K recursively as follows:
a) If F (~p) is pi, then JF (~ϕ)K = {ϕi}.
b) If F (~p) is ¬G(~p), then JF (~ϕ)K = {¬ψ | ψ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K}.
c) If F (~p) is G(~p) ∨H(~p), then JF (~ϕ)K = {ψ ∨ θ | ψ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K and θ ∈ JH(~ϕ)K}.
d) If F (~p) is G(~p) ∧H(~p), then JF (~ϕ)K = {ψ ∧ θ | ψ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K and θ ∈ JH(~ϕ)K}.
11
e) If F (~p) is G(~p), then
JF (~ϕ)K = {t:Xψ | ψ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K, t ∈ TermJ , and X is the set of witness variables occurring in ψ}.
Clearly, for every template F (~p) and every sequence ~ϕ of Henkin formulas, JF (~ϕ)K is a set of Henkin
formulas.
Definition 6.3. We say the template F is positive if the only boolean connectives in F are ∧ and ∨
(no ¬), and F is disjunctive if the only boolean connective that occurs in F is ∨ (no ∧, no ¬).
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of some fundamental facts about templates. Through-
out we assume that there is a fixed variant closed and axiomatically appropriate constant specification
CS for the basic language, and that CS(V) is its extension. To keep things simple, we will not re-
fer to this assumption in every proposition and, in this section only, we shall write ‘⊢’ to denote
‘⊢CS(V)’, ‘consistent’ to denote ‘CS(V)-consistent’, ‘inconsistent’ to denote ‘CS(V)-inconsistent’ and
‘maximal-consistent’ to denote ‘CS(V)-maximal consistent’.
Proposition 6.4 (Semi-replacement). Let F (~p, q) be a positive template, χ and ψ Henkin formulas,
and ~ϕ a sequence of Henkin formulas. If ⊢ χ→ ψ, then for every φ ∈ JF (~ϕ, χ)K there is a θ ∈ JF (~ϕ, ψ)K
such that ⊢ φ→ θ.
Proof. By induction on the degree of F (~p,q).
Suppose first that F (~p,q) is atomic. There are two cases to consider.
i) F (~p,q) = pi where pi is in ~p. Then JF (~ϕ, χ)K = JF (~ϕ, ψ)K = {ϕi} so φ→ θ will be ϕi → ϕi.
ii) F (~p,q) = q. Then JF (~ϕ, χ)K = {χ} and JF (~ϕ, ψ)K = {ψ}, so φ→ θ will be χ→ ψ.
Next assume that F (~p,q) is G(~p,q) ∨ H(~p,q) and the result is known for G(~p,q) and H(~p,q).
Let φ ∈ JF (~ϕ, χ)K. Then φ is φ′ ∨ φ′′ where φ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ, χ)K and φ′′ ∈ JH(~ϕ, χ)K. By the induction
hypothesis, there are θ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ, ψ)K and θ′′ ∈ JH(~ϕ, ψ)K such that ⊢ φ′ → θ′ and ⊢ φ′′ → θ′′ and hence
⊢ φ′ ∨ φ′′ → θ′ ∨ θ′′. Since θ′ ∨ θ′′ ∈ JF (~ϕ, ψ)K, take θ as θ′ ∨ θ′′.
If F (~p,q) is G(~p,q) ∧H(~p,q), then the argument is similar to the previous one.
Suppose F (~p,q) is G(~p,q) and the result is known for G(~p,q). Let φ ∈ JF (~ϕ, χ)K; then φ is
t :Xφ
′ where φ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ, χ)K. By the induction hypothesis, there is some θ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ, ψ)K such that
⊢ φ′ → θ′. By Internalization, 2.9, there is a justification term s ∈ TermJ such that ⊢ s:(φ′ → θ′). By
repeated use of axiom A3 and classical reasoning ⊢ s:X(φ′ → θ′). By axiom B2 and modus ponens,
⊢ t:Xφ′ → [s · t]:Xθ′. Let Y be the set of all witness variables that occur in θ′. By repeated use of
axioms A2 and A3, we have that ⊢ [s · t]:Xθ
′ → [s · t]:Y θ
′, and hence ⊢ t:Xφ
′ → [s · t]:Y θ
′. Since
[s · t]:Y θ′ ∈ JF (~ϕ, ψ)K, take θ to be [s · t]:Y θ′. 
Corollary 6.5 (Variable change). Let Γ ⊆ FmlJ(V), F (~p, q) be a positive template, ~ϕ be a sequence
of Henkin formulas, ∀xϕ(x) be a Henkin formula, and y be a basic variable that does not occur free or
bound in ∀xϕ(x). If Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K is consistent, then Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀yϕ(y))K is consistent.
Proof. Suppose Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀yϕ(y))K is inconsistent. Then there are ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn ∈ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀yϕ(y))K
such that Γ ⊢ ψ1∨ . . . ∨ψn. By classical logic, ⊢ ∀yϕ(y)→ ∀xϕ(x). Since ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ JF (~ϕ, ∀yϕ(y))K,
by Proposition 6.4, for each ψi there is some θi ∈ JF (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K such that ⊢ ψi → θi, and hence
Γ ⊢ θ1 ∨ . . . ∨ θn. Since each ¬θi ∈ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K, Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K is inconsistent. 
Proposition 6.6 (Vacuous quantification). Let F (~p) be a disjunctive template, and ~ϕ be a sequence
of Henkin formulas none of which contain free occurrences of the basic variable y. For each ψ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K
there is some θ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K such that ⊢ ∃yψ → θ.
Proof. By induction on the degree of F (~p).
Suppose F (~p) is pi. Then JF (~ϕ)K = {ϕi}. Since y does not occur free in ϕi, ⊢ ∃yϕi → ϕi, so we
take θ to be ϕi.
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Next assume that F (~p) is G(~p)∨H(~p) and the result is known for G(~p) and H(~p). Let ψ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K.
Then ψ is ψ′ ∨ ψ′′ where ψ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K and ψ′′ ∈ JH(~ϕ)K. By the induction hypothesis there are
θ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K and θ′′ ∈ JH(~ϕ)K such that ⊢ ∃yψ′ → θ′ and ⊢ ∃yψ′′ → θ′′. By classical logic,
⊢ ∃y(ψ′ ∨ψ′′)←→ (∃yψ′ ∨ ∃yψ′′), hence ⊢ ∃y(ψ′ ∨ψ′′)→ θ′ ∨ θ′′. Since θ′ ∨ θ′′ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K, take θ to be
θ′ ∨ θ′′.
Finally suppose F (~p) is G(~p) and the result is known for G(~p). Let ψ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K. So ψ is t:Xφ
where φ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K. By the axiomA3, ⊢ t:Xφ→ t:Xyφ. Then using classical logic, ⊢ ∃yt:Xφ→ ∃yt:Xyφ.
By definition, X is a set of witness variables and since y is a basic variable we have that y /∈ X ; so by
2. of Theorem 2.10, ⊢ ∃yt:Xyφ→ s(t):X∃yφ.
By the induction hypothesis, there is some θ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K such that ⊢ ∃yφ→ θ′. By Internalization,
2.9, there is a justification term s′ ∈ TermJ such that ⊢ s′ :X(∃yφ → θ′). Using axiom B2, ⊢ s(t):
X∃yφ → [s′ · s(t)]:Xθ′. Let Y be the set of all witness variables that occur in θ′. By repeated use of
axioms A2 and A3, we have ⊢ [s′ · s(t)]:Xθ′ → [s′ · s(t)]:Y θ′, hence ⊢ ∃yt:Xφ → [s′ · s(t)]:Y θ′. Since
[s′ · s(t)]:Y θ′ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K, we take θ to be [s′ · s(t)]:Y θ′. 
Proposition 6.7 (Generalized Barcan). Let F (~p, q) be a disjunctive template, y a basic variable,
ϕ(y) a Henkin formula, and ~ϕ a sequence of Henkin formulas none of which contain free occurrences
of y. For each ψ ∈ JF (~ϕ, ϕ(y))K there is some θ ∈ JF (~ϕ, ∀yϕ(y))K such that ⊢ ∀yψ → θ.
Proof. By induction on the degree of F (~p,q).
If F (~p,q) is atomic, then the result is trivial.
Next assume that F (~p,q) is G(~p,q) ∨ H(~p,q) and the result is known for G(~p,q) and H(~p,q).
By the definition of template, the propositional variable q can occur at most once in F (~p,q), so either
it does not occur in G(~p,q) or it does not occur in H(~p,q). Assume that it does not occur in H(~p,q)
(the other case has a similar proof); then we can write H(~p,q) as H(~p).
Let ψ ∈ JF (~ϕ, ϕ(y))K. So ψ is φ′ ∨ φ′′ where φ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ, ϕ(y))K and φ′′ ∈ JH(~ϕ)K. By classical logic
we have ⊢ ∀y(φ′ ∨ φ′′) → (∀yφ′ ∨ ∃yφ′′). Since y does not occur free in any formula of ~ϕ, then by
Proposition 6.6 there is some θ′′ ∈ JH(~ϕ)K such that ⊢ ∃yφ′′ → θ′′. By the induction hypothesis, there
is some θ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ, ∀yϕ(y))K such that ⊢ ∀yψ′ → θ′ and hence ⊢ ∀y(φ′ ∨ φ′′) → θ′ ∨ θ′′. Then we can
take θ as θ′ ∨ θ′′.
Suppose F (~p,q) is G(~p,q) and the result is known for G(~p,q). Let ψ ∈ JF (~ϕ, ϕ(y))K. Then ψ is
t:Xφ where φ ∈ JG(~ϕ, ϕ(y))K. By axiom Bb, ⊢ ∀yt:Xyφ→ b(t):X∀yφ. By axiom A3, ⊢ t:Xφ→ t:Xyφ
so by classical logic, ⊢ ∀yt:Xφ→ ∀yt:Xyφ. Then ⊢ ∀yt:Xφ→ b(t):X∀yφ.
By the induction hypothesis, there is some θ′ ∈ JG(~ϕ, ∀yϕ(y))K such that ⊢ ∀yφ → θ′. By Inter-
nalization, 2.9, and axiom A3, there is a justification term s ∈ TermJ such that ⊢ s:X(∀yφ → θ′).
Then by axiom B2, ⊢ b(t):X∀yφ → [s · b(t)]:Xθ′. Let Y be the set of all witness variables that occur
in θ′. By repeated use of axioms A2 and A3, we have that ⊢ [s · b(t)]:Xθ′ → [s · b(t)]:Y θ′ and hence
⊢ ∀yt:Xφ→ [s · b(t)]:Y θ′. Take θ to be [s · b(t)]:Y θ′. 
Proposition 6.8 (Formula combining). Let F (~p) be a disjunctive template, and ~ϕ be a sequence
of Henkin formulas. For any ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ JF (~ϕ)K there is a formula θ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K such that ⊢ (ψ1 ∨
. . . ∨ ψk)→ θ.
Proof. Induction on the degree of F (~p).
If F (~p) is atomic, the result is trivial.
Assume that F (~p) is G(~p) ∨H(~p) and the result is known for G(~p) and H(~p). Let ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈
JF (~ϕ)K. Then there are φ
′
1, . . . , φ
′
k ∈ JG(~ϕ)K and φ
′′
1 , . . . , φ
′′
k ∈ JH(~ϕ)K, such that ψi = φ
′
i ∨ φ
′′
i . By
the induction hypothesis, there are θ
′
∈ JG(~ϕ)K and θ
′′
∈ JH(~ϕ)K such that ⊢ (φ
′
1 ∨ . . . ∨φ
′
k)→ θ
′ and
⊢ (φ
′′
1 ∨ . . . ∨ φ
′′
k ) → θ
′′. Then ⊢ ((φ
′
1 ∨ . . . ∨ φ
′
k) ∨ (φ
′′
1 ∨ . . . ∨ φ
′′
k )) → θ
′ ∨ θ′′ and by rearranging,
⊢ ((φ
′
1 ∨φ
′′
1 )∨ . . . ∨ (φ
′
k ∨φ
′′
k ))→ θ
′ ∨ θ′′. That is, ⊢ (ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ψk)→ θ′ ∨ θ′′, so take θ to be θ′ ∨ θ′′.
13
Assume that F (~p) is G(~p) and the result is known for G(~p). Let ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ JF (~ϕ)K. Then
there are justification terms t1, . . . , tk and φ1, . . . , φk ∈ JG(~ϕ)K such that ψi = ti :Xiφi. By the
induction hypothesis, there is some θ
′
∈ JG(~ϕ)K such that ⊢ (φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φk)→ θ′.
By classical reasoning, for each i, ⊢ φi → θ
′. Then by Internalization, 2.9, and axiom A3 there
are justification terms s1, . . . , sk ∈ TermJ such that for each i, ⊢ si :Xi(φi → θ
′). Using axiom
B2, ⊢ ti :Xiφi → [si · ti] :Xiθ
′, and then by axiom B3 we have that for each i, ⊢ [si · ti] :Xiθ
′ →
[[s1 · t1] + . . . + [sk · tk]]:Xiθ
′.
Let Y be the set of all witness variables that occur in θ′. By repeated use of axioms A2 and
A3, we have ⊢ [[s1 · t1] + . . . + [sk · tk]] :Xiθ
′ → [[s1 · t1] + . . . + [sk · tk]] :Y θ′, and so for each i,
⊢ ti:Xiφi → [[s1 · t1]+ . . . +[sk · tk]]:Y θ
′. Then ⊢ (t1:X1φ1∨ . . . ∨tk:Xkφk)→ [[s1 · t1]+ . . . +[sk · tk]]:Y θ
′.
Since [[s1 · t1] + . . . + [sk · tk]]:Y θ′ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K, we can take θ to be [[s1 · t1] + . . . + [sk · tk]]:Y θ′. 
Proposition 6.9 (Existential Instantiation). Let F (~p, q) be a disjunctive template, Γ ⊆ FmlJ ,
~χ be a sequence of Henkin formulas, ∀xϕ(x) be a Henkin formula, and a be a witness variable that
does not occur free in ∀xϕ(x) or in any member of ~χ. If Γ ∪ J¬F (~χ, ∀xϕ(x))K is consistent, then
Γ ∪ J¬F (~χ, ϕ(a))K is consistent.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Suppose Γ ∪ J¬F (~χ, ϕ(a))K is inconsistent. We show that Γ ∪
J¬F (~χ, ∀xϕ(x))K is inconsistent.
Assuming Γ ∪ J¬F (~χ, ϕ(a))K is inconsistent, there are ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ and ¬φ1(a), . . . , ¬φk(a) ∈
J¬F (~χ, ϕ(a))K such that ⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn) ∧ (¬φ1(a) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬φk(a)) → ⊥. It follows that ⊢ (ψ1 ∧
. . . ∧ ψn) → (φ1(a) ∨ . . . ∨ φk(a)). By Proposition 6.8 there is some ψ(a) ∈ JF (~χ, ϕ(a))K such that
⊢ (φ1(a) ∨ . . . ∨ φk(a)) → ψ(a) and hence ⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn)→ ψ(a). Note that since Γ ⊆ FmlJ is a
set of basic formulas, a does not occur in any formula of Γ.
By Corollary 5.7, ⊢ ∀y[(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ψn)→ ψ(y)], where y is a new basic variable replacing all (free)
occurrences of witness variable a. And since there were no occurrences of a in any ψi, after substitution
there are no occurrences of y, hence ⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn)→ ∀yψ(y).
Since a does not occur in any formula of ~χ, it can be easily checked that for every formula γ(a):
if γ(a) ∈ JF (~χ, ϕ(a))K, then γ(y) ∈ JF (~χ, ϕ(y))K. Then ψ(y) ∈ JF (~χ, ϕ(y))K, and since y is new
it does not occur in ~χ, by Proposition 6.7 there is a θ ∈ JF (~χ, ∀yϕ(y))K such that ⊢ ∀yψ(y) → θ,
and thus ⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn) → θ. Since ¬θ ∈ J¬F (~χ, ∀yϕ(y))K but ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ, it follows that
Γ ∪ J¬F (~χ, ∀yϕ(y))K is inconsistent, and by Corollary 6.5, Γ ∪ J¬F (~χ, ∀xϕ(x))K is inconsistent. 
In a propositional modal setting, a way of formulating the standard definition of the accessibility
relation is this. Possible worlds are maximally consistent sets. For a possible world Γ, define Γ# =
{ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ}. Then, for two possible worlds, set ΓR∆ if Γ# ⊆ ∆. The following will give us the
appropriate analog for quantified justification logic models.
Definition 6.10. Suppose Γ ⊆ FmlJ (V). Let Γ# be the set of all formulas ∀~yϕ such that t:Xϕ ∈ Γ
for some closed Henkin formula t:Xϕ in which X is the set of witness variables in ϕ, and ~y are the free
basic variables of ϕ.
Proposition 6.11 (Up and Down Consistency). Let F (~p) = G(~p) be a template, Γ ⊆ FmlJ(V),
and ~ϕ a sequence of Henkin formulas.
1. Suppose Γ is maximally consistent. If Γ# ∪ J¬G(~ϕ)K is consistent, so is Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K.
2. Suppose G(~p) is a disjunctive template. If Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K is consistent, so is Γ# ∪ J¬G(~ϕ)K.
Proof. Part 1: Suppose Γ is maximally consistent but Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K is inconsistent. We show Γ# ∪
J¬G(~ϕ)K is inconsistent.
Since Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K is inconsistent, for some ¬t1 :X1θ1, . . . , ¬tk :Xkθk ∈ J¬F (~ϕ)K we have that
Γ ∪ {¬t1:X1θ1, . . . ,¬tk:Xkθk} ⊢ ⊥. (Note that θ1, . . . , θk ∈ JG(~ϕ)K.) Using the Deduction Theorem,
Γ ⊢ (¬t1:X1θ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬tk:Xkθk)→ ⊥, and hence Γ ⊢ t1:X1θ1 ∨ . . . ∨ tk:Xkθk.
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Since Γ is a maximally consistent set, for some i, ti:Xiθi ∈ Γ. And since ti :Xiθi is a closed
Henkin formula, ∀~xθi ∈ Γ#. By classical logic, ⊢ ¬θi → ¬∀~xθi. Since ¬θi ∈ J¬G(~ϕ)K, we have that
Γ# ∪ J¬G(~ϕ)K is inconsistent.
Part 2: Suppose Γ# ∪ J¬G(~ϕ)K is inconsistent. We show that Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K is inconsistent.
Assume Γ# ∪ J¬G(~ϕ)K is inconsistent. Then there are ∀~x1ψ1, . . . , ∀~xnψn ∈ Γ# and ¬θ1, . . . ,¬θk ∈
J¬G(~ϕ)K such that ⊢ (∀~x1ψ1∧ . . . ∧∀~xnψn)∧(¬θ1∧ . . . ∧¬θk)→ ⊥, and so ⊢ (∀~x1ψ1∧ . . . ∧∀~xnψn)→
(θ1∨ . . . ∨θk). Note that since ∀~x1ψ1, . . . , ∀~xnψn ∈ Γ
#, by definition of Γ# there must be corresponding
t1:X1ψ1, . . . , tn:Xnψn ∈ Γ.
Since θ1, . . . , θk ∈ JG(~ϕ)K and G(~p) is a disjunctive template, by Proposition 6.8 there is some
θ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K such that ⊢ (θ1 ∨ . . . ∨ θk)→ θ. Then by classical logic, ⊢ ∀~x1ψ1 → . . . → ∀~xnψn → θ.
For each i, no member of the sequence ~xi may occur in the corresponding setXi of witness variables.
Then by repeated use of axiom B5 we have that for each i, ⊢ ti:Xiψi → gen~xi(t):Xi∀~xiψi. (We noted
in Section 3 that gen~xi would abbreviate nested occurrences of gen.) If we let X = X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xn, by
using axiom A3, ⊢ ti:Xiψi → gen~xi(t):X∀~xiψi.
We have that ⊢ ∀~x1ψ1 → . . . → ∀~xnψn → θ. Then by Internalization, 2.9, and axiom A3
there is a justification term s ∈ TermJ such that ⊢ s:X(∀~x1ψ1 → . . . → ∀~xnψn → θ), where X is
X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xn. Then by repeated use of axiom B2, ⊢ gen~x1(t):X∀~x1ψ1 → . . . → gen~xn(t)X∀~xnψn →
[s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)] :Xθ. Let Y be the set of those witness variables occurring in θ. Using
axioms A2 and A3, ⊢ [s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)]:Xθ → [s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)]:Y θ. Combining,
we have ⊢ gen~x1(t):X∀~x1ψ1 → . . . → gen~xn(t)X∀~xnψn → [s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)]:Y θ, and hence
⊢ [gen~x1(t):X∀~x1ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ gen~xn(t)X∀~xnψn]→ [s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)]:Y θ. We showed above that
for each i, ⊢ ti:Xiψi → gen~xi(t):X∀~xiψi. Then by classical reasoning, ⊢ (t1:X1ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn:Xnψn) →
[s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)]:Y θ.
Finally, each ti:Xiψi ∈ Γ so Γ ⊢ [s ·gen~x1(t)· . . . ·gen~xn(t)]:Y θ. Also θ ∈ JG(~ϕ)K, and F (~p) = G(~p),
so [s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)]:Y θ ∈ JF (~ϕ)K, and hence ¬[s · gen~x1(t) · . . . · gen~xn(t)]:Y θ ∈ J¬F (~ϕ)K. It
follows that Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K is inconsistent. 
Definition 6.12 (Admitting instantiation). A set of formulas Γ admits instantiation provided that
for each disjunctive template F (~p,q), for each sequence ~ϕ of Henkin formulas, and each universally
quantified Henkin formula ∀xϕ(x), if Γ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K is consistent, then for some witness variable
a, Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ϕ(a))K is consistent.
Proposition 6.13. Suppose Γ is maximally consistent and admits instantiation. For every universal
Henkin formula ∀xϕ(x), if ¬∀xϕ(x) ∈ Γ, then there is a witness variable a such that ¬ϕ(a) ∈ Γ.
Proof. If ¬∀xϕ(x) ∈ Γ, then of course Γ ∪ {¬∀xϕ(x)} is consistent. Let q be a propositional letter;
F (q) = q is trivially a disjunctive template. Since J¬F (∀xϕ(x))K = {¬∀xϕ(x)}, then Γ∪J¬F (∀xϕ(x))K
is consistent. Since Γ admits instantiation, there is a witness variable a such that Γ ∪ J¬F (ϕ(a))K is
consistent, i.e., Γ ∪ {¬ϕ(a)} is consistent. By the maximality of Γ, ¬ϕ(a) ∈ Γ. 
Proposition 6.14. Let Γ ⊆ FmlJ(V). If Γ is maximally consistent and admits instantiation, then
Γ# also admits instantiation.
Proof. Suppose Γ is maximally consistent, Γ admits instantiation, F (~p,q) is a disjunctive template, ~ϕ
is a sequence of Henkin formulas, ∀xϕ(x) is a Henkin formula, and Γ#∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K is consistent.
By item 1. of Proposition 6.11, Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K is consistent. F (~p,q) is also a disjunctive
template. Then, since Γ admits instantiation, for some witness variable a, Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ϕ(a))K is
consistent. By item 2. of Proposition 6.11, Γ# ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ϕ(a))K is consistent. 
7 Using Templates for Henkin-Like Constructions
The set of all disjunctives templates is countable, as are FmlJ(V), and the set of all finite sequences ~ϕ
of Henkin formulas. Hence the set of all pairs 〈F (~p), ~ϕ〉 is countable, where F is a disjunctive template,
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~p is an n-ary sequence of propositional variables and ~ϕ is an n-ary sequence of Henkin formulas. For
the rest of this section we shall assume that the members of the set of all such disjunctive template,
formula pairs 〈F (~p), ~ϕ〉 is arranged in a fixed sequence which we will call the enumerated sequence.
〈F1(~p1), ~ϕ1〉, 〈F2(~p2), ~ϕ2〉, 〈F3(~p3), ~ϕ3〉, . . .
The enumerated sequence determines a corresponding sequence of instantiation sets of the enumerated
sequence:
JF1(~ϕ1)K, JF2(~ϕ2)K, JF3(~ϕ3)K, . . .
It should be noted that for two different pairs 〈Fi(~pi), ~ϕi〉, 〈Fj(~pj), ~ϕj〉 in the enumerated sequence,
the corresponding instantiation sets may be the same. For example, the pairs 〈p0, 〈∀xϕ(x)〉〉 and
〈p1, 〈∀xϕ(x)〉〉 determine the same set {∀xϕ(x)}. This is actually useful to us. If JFi(~ϕi)K is an instan-
tiation set, instantiating JFi(~ϕi)K, we can always find a different member JFj(~ϕj)K of the enumerated
sequence with different propositional variables, having the same instantiation set.
Lemma 7.1. Let CS be a variant closed and axiomatically appropriate constant specification for the
basic language, CS(V) its extension, and Γ ⊆ FmlJ . For any finite union of instantiation sets of
the enumerated sequence JFi1 (~ϕi1)K ∪ . . . ∪ JFin(~ϕin)K, for any disjunctive template G(~q, r), and for
any Henkin formulas ~ψ, ∀xϕ(x) if Γ ∪ J¬Fi1 (~ϕi1)K ∪ . . . ∪ J¬Fin(~ϕin)K ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x)K is CS(V)-
consistent, then there is a witness variable a such that Γ∪J¬Fi1 (~ϕi1 )K∪ . . .∪J¬Fin (~ϕin)K∪J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K
is CS(V)-consistent.
Proof. We assume that JFi1 (~ϕi1)K, . . . , JFin (~ϕin)K instantiate 〈Fi1 (~pi1 ), ~ϕi1〉, . . . 〈Fin(~pin), ~ϕin〉 and,
making use of the remarks above, there is no repetition among the propositional variables ~pi1 , . . . , ~pin ,
~q, r. Then Fi1(~pi1) ∨ . . . ∨ Fin(~pin) ∨G(~q, r) is a disjunctive template.
From the definition of instantiation set, using classical reasoning, it can easily be checked that the
following sets have the same consequences.
Γ ∪ J¬Fi1 (~ϕi1)K ∪ . . . ∪ J¬Fin (~ϕin)K ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K ,
Γ ∪ J¬Fi1 (~ϕi1) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Fin(~ϕin) ∧ ¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K ,
Γ ∪ J¬(Fi1 (~ϕi1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ Fin(~ϕin) ∨G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x)))K .
Then Γ ∪ J¬(Fi1 (~ϕi1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ Fin(~ϕin) ∨G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x)))K is CS(V)-consistent.
Γ is a set of formulas from the basic language and so contains no witness variables. Consequently
there are only finitely many witness variables that occur in Γ, ~ϕi1 , . . . , ~ϕin ,
~ψ and ∀xϕ(x). Let a be the
first witness variable that does not occur. Then, by Proposition 6.9 , Γ∪ J¬(Fi1 (~ϕi1)∨ . . . ∨Fin(~ϕik )∨
G(~ψ, ϕ(a)))K is CS(V)-consistent. It follows that Γ ∪ J¬Fi1 (~ϕi1 )K ∪ . . . ∪ J¬Fin (~ϕin)K ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K
is CS(V)-consistent. 
Proposition 7.2 (Basic expansion). Let CS be a variant closed and axiomatically appropriate
constant specification for the basic language, CS(V) be its extension, and let Γ ⊆ FmlJ be a CS-
consistent set. Then there is some Γ′ ⊆ FmlJ(V) such that Γ ⊆ Γ′, Γ′ is a CS(V)-maximally consistent
set, and Γ′ admits instantiation.
Proof. We define a sequence of sets of FmlJ (V) formulas Γ1,Γ2,Γ3, . . . so that:
• Γn is CS(V)-consistent.
• Γn is Γ ∪ J¬Fi1 (~ϕi1)K ∪ . . . ∪ J¬Fik (~ϕik )K (where k ≥ 0).
To begin, set Γ1 = Γ. By the remark at the end of Section 5, Γ1 is CS(V)-consistent because it is
CS-consistent.
Now, suppose Γn has been constructed and it is of the form Γ ∪ J¬Fi1 (~ϕi1)K ∪ . . . ∪ J¬Fik (~ϕik )K.
Let 〈Fn(~pn), ~ϕn〉 be the n
th member of the enumerated sequence. If the last formula in ~ϕn is not a
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universal formula, let Γn+1 = Γn. Otherwise we proceed as follows. Assume ~ϕn is ~ψ, ∀xϕ(x). Say
Fn(~pn) is the disjunctive template G(~q, r), and so J¬Fn(~ϕn)K = J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K.
If Γn ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K is not CS(V)-consistent, then take Γn+1 to be Γn.
If Γn ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K is CS(V)-consistent, then by Lemma 7.1 there is a witness variable a such
that the set Γn ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K is consistent. We take Γn+1 to be Γn ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K.
It can easily be checked that
⋃
n∈ω Γn is CS(V)-consistent. Then by Proposition 5.9 there is a set
Γ′ such that
⋃
n∈ω Γn ⊆ Γ
′ and Γ′ is CS(V)-maximal consistent. Clearly, Γ ⊆
⋃
n∈ω Γn ⊆ Γ
′. Now we
show that Γ′ admits instantiation.
Let ~ϕ be a sequence of Henkin formulas, ∀xϕ(x) be a Henkin formula and F (~p,q) be a disjunctive
template. Suppose that Γ′∪J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K is CS(V)-consistent. For some k ∈ ω, 〈F (~p,q), 〈~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x)〉〉
is the kth term of the enumerated sequence. Since Γk ⊆
⋃
n∈ω Γn ⊆ Γ
′, Γk ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ∀xϕ(x))K is
CS(V)-consistent. By construction, for some witness variable a, Γk+1 = Γk ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ϕ(a))K is CS(V)-
consistent. Thus J¬F (~ϕ, ϕ(a))K ⊆ Γ′ and hence Γ′ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ, ϕ(a))K is CS(V)-consistent. 
Lemma 7.3. Suppose Γ is a set of formulas that admits instantiation, F (~p) is a disjunctive template,
and ~ϕ is a sequence of Henkin formulas. Then, Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K also admits instantiation.
Proof. Let ~ψ be a sequence of Henkin formulas, ∀xϕ(x) a Henkin formula and G(~q, r) a disjunctive
template. Suppose (Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K) ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K is CS(V)-consistent.
As before, we can assume that there is no overlap between the propositional variables ~p, ~q and r,
so F (~p) ∨G(~q, r) is a disjunctive template. And as before, the sets
(Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K) ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K ,
Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ) ∧ ¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K ,
Γ ∪ J¬(F (~ϕ) ∨G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x)))K
have the same consequences. Then Γ∪ J¬(F (~ϕ)∨G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x)))K is CS(V)-consistent. Since Γ admits
instantiation, there is a witness variable a such that Γ ∪ J¬(F (~ϕ) ∨ G(~ψ, ϕ(a)))K is CS(V)-consistent.
Hence, (Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K) ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K is CS(V)-consistent. 
Proposition 7.4 (Secondary expansion). Let CS be a variant closed and axiomatically appropriate
constant specification for the basic language, CS(V) be its extension, and Γ ⊆ FmlJ(V) be a CS(V)-
consistent set that admits instantiation. Then there is some Γ′ ⊆ FmlJ (V) such that Γ ⊆ Γ′, Γ′ is
CS(V)-maximally consistent, and Γ′ admits instantiation.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 7.2.
We define a sequence Γ1,Γ2, . . . of CS(V)-consistent sets that admit instantiation. To begin,
Γ1 = Γ.
Next, suppose Γn has been constructed. Let 〈Fn(~pn), ~ϕn〉 be the n
th pair of the enumerated
sequence. If the last term of the sequence ~ϕn is not a universal formula, let Γn+1 = Γn. Otherwise,
proceed as follows. ~ϕn is of the form ~ψ, ∀xϕ(x). And Fn(~pn) is the disjunctive template G(~q, r) and
so J¬Fn(~ϕn)K = J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K. If Γn∪ J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K is not CS(V)-consistent, then take Γn+1 as
Γn. If Γn∪J¬G(~ψ, ∀xϕ(x))K is CS(V)-consistent then, since Γn admits instantiation, there is a witness
variable a such that Γn∪J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K is CS(V)-consistent. By Lemma 7.3, Γn∪J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K admits
instantiation. So, take Γn+1 as Γn ∪ J¬G(~ψ, ϕ(a))K.
As before, it can be checked that
⋃
n∈ω Γn is a CS(V)-consistent set that admits instantiation. By
Proposition 5.9 there is a set Γ′ such that
⋃
n∈ω Γn ⊆ Γ
′ and Γ′ is CS(V)-maximal consistent. It is
easy to see that Γ′ admits instantiation. 
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8 The Canonical Model
We now define the canonical model and show it behaves as expected. The domain will, of course, be
the set of witness variables.
Definition 8.1 (Canonical model). A canonical model M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉, using constant speci-
fication CS, is defined as follows.
• W is the set of all CS(V)-maximally consistent sets that admit instantiation.
• Let Γ,∆ ∈ W . ΓR∆ iff Γ# ⊆ ∆ (as defined in 6.10).
• D = V.
• For an n-place relation symbol P and for Γ ∈ W , let I(P,Γ) be the set of all ~a where ~a ∈ V and
P (~a) ∈ Γ.
• For Γ ∈ W , set Γ ∈ E(t, ϕ) iff t:Xϕ ∈ Γ, where t:Xϕ is a closed Henkin formula and X is the set
of witness variables in ϕ.
First we need to check thatM is indeed a Fitting model meeting CS. Since the argument is similar
to the one presented in [8, pp. 13-14] we are only going to consider a few of the cases.
R is reflexive. Let Γ ∈ W and suppose ∀~yϕ(~y) ∈ Γ#. Then there is a closed Henkin formula
t :Xϕ(~y) ∈ Γ such that ~y is an n-ary sequence of basic variables none of which occur in X . By
repeated use of axiom B5 and classical reasoning, ⊢CS(V) t:Xϕ(~y) → gen~y :X∀~yϕ(~y). By axiom B1,
⊢CS(V) gen~y:X∀~yϕ(~y) → ∀~yϕ(~y) hence, by the maximal consistency of Γ, ∀~yϕ(~y) ∈ Γ. Thus Γ
# ⊆ Γ,
i.e., ΓRΓ.
R is transitive. Let Γ,∆,Θ ∈ W such that ΓR∆ and ∆RΘ. Assume ∀~yψ(~a, ~y) ∈ Γ#, where ~a
is a sequence of witness variables and ~y is a sequence of basic variables. Then for some justification
term t, t:{~a}ψ(~a, ~y) ∈ Γ.
By axiom B4 and by the maximal consistency of Γ, !t:{~a}t:{~a}ψ(~a, ~y) ∈ Γ. Since t:{~a}ψ(~a, ~y) has
no free basic variables and ΓR∆, then t:{~a}ψ(~a, ~y) ∈ ∆. And since ∆RΘ, then ∀~yψ(~a, ~y) ∈ Θ. Thus,
Γ# ⊆ Θ, i.e., ΓRΘ.
! Condition. Let Γ ∈ W . Suppose that Γ ∈ E(t, ϕ(~a)) and X is a set of witness variables such that
{~a} ⊆ X . Since Γ ∈ E(t, ϕ(~a)), t:{~a}ϕ(~a) ∈ Γ. Using axiom A3 and the maximality of Γ, t:Xϕ(~a) ∈ Γ.
Then by axiom B4, !t:X t:Xϕ(~a) ∈ Γ, i.e., Γ ∈ E(!t, t:Xϕ(~a)).
b Condition. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose Γ ∈ W and, for every d ∈ V, Γ ∈ E(t, ϕ(~a, d))
but Γ /∈ E(b(t), ∀yϕ(~a, y)). Equivalently using the definition of E in the canonical model, t:{~a,d}ϕ(~a, d) ∈
Γ for every d ∈ V, but b(t):{~a}∀yϕ(~a, y) /∈ Γ. We show this leads to contradiction.
By the maximality of Γ, ¬b(t):{~a}∀yϕ(~a, y) ∈ Γ. By axiom Bb and classical reasoning, ⊢CS(V)
¬b(t):{~a}∀yϕ(~a, y) → ¬∀yt:{~a,y}ϕ(~a, y) and thus, ¬∀yt:{~a,y}ϕ(~a, y) ∈ Γ. By Proposition 6.13 there is
some a∗ ∈ V such that ¬t:{~a,a∗}ϕ(~a, a
∗) ∈ Γ. But this contradicts the fact that t:{~a,d}ϕ(~a, d) ∈ Γ for
every d ∈ V.
CS Condition. Recall that a model M meets constant specification CS provided, whenever
c :ϕ ∈ CS, then E(c, ϕ) = W . Let c :ϕ be a member of CS and Γ a member of W . Since Γ is a
CS(V)-maximally consistent set, CS ⊆ CS(V) ⊆ Γ. Hence, c :ϕ ∈ Γ and from this it follows that
Γ ∈ E(c, ϕ).
We have shown that the canonical model is a Fitting model meeting CS. Now, we have a version
of the usual Truth Lemma.
Lemma 8.2 (Truth lemma). Let M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a canonical model. For each Γ ∈ W and
for each closed Henkin formula ϕ,
M,Γ  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ .
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Proof. By induction on the degree of ϕ. The crucial cases are when ϕ is t:Xψ and when ϕ is ∀xψ(x),
and these are the only ones we discuss. Assume the induction hypothesis holds for formulas less
complex than ϕ.
Assume that ϕ is t:Xψ.
(⇒) Suppose t :Xψ /∈ Γ. Let X ′ ⊆ X be the set containing exactly the witness variables that
occur in ψ. It is not the case that t:X′ψ ∈ Γ, because otherwise, by axiom A3 and by the maximal
consistency of Γ, t:Xψ ∈ Γ. So by the definition of E , Γ /∈ E(t, ψ), and thus M,Γ 6 t:Xψ.
(⇐) Suppose t :Xψ ∈ Γ. Let X ′ ⊆ X be as above. Then by the axiom A2 and the maximal
consistency of Γ, t:X′ψ ∈ Γ, and hence Γ ∈ E(t, ψ). Now, let ∆ ∈ W such that ΓR∆. Since Γ# ⊆ ∆,
we have that ∀~yψ ∈ ∆ where ~y are the free basic variables of ψ. Then by classical logic and the
maximal consistency of ∆, for every ~a ∈ V, ψ(~a) ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis, for every ~a ∈ V,
M,∆  ψ(~a). Therefore, M,Γ  t:X′ψ, and so M,Γ  t:Xψ.
Assume that ϕ is ∀xψ(x).
(⇒) Suppose ∀xψ(x) /∈ Γ. By the maximal consistency of Γ, ¬∀xψ(x) ∈ Γ. Since Γ admits
instantiation, then by Proposition 6.13 there is an a ∈ V such that ¬ψ(a) ∈ Γ. By the consistency of
Γ, ψ(a) /∈ Γ. By the induction hypothesis, M,Γ 6 ψ(a), thus M,Γ 6 ∀xψ(x).
(⇐) Suppose ∀xψ(x) ∈ Γ. By the classical axioms and the maximal consistency of Γ, for every
a ∈ V, ψ(a) ∈ Γ. By the induction hypothesis, M,Γ  ψ(a), for every a ∈ V. Therefore, M,Γ 
∀xψ(x). 
Theorem 8.3 (Completeness for FOLPb). Let CS be a variant closed and axiomatically appropriate
constant specification. For every closed formula ϕ ∈ FmlJ , if CS ϕ, then ⊢CS ϕ.
Proof. Suppose 6⊢CS ϕ. Then {¬ϕ} is CS-consistent. By Proposition 7.2, there is a CS(V)-maximally
consistent Γ such that Γ admits instantiation and {¬ϕ} ⊆ Γ. By the Truth lemma, M,Γ  ¬ϕ, so
M,Γ 6 ϕ. Hence, 6CS ϕ. 
Definition 8.4 (Fully explanatory). A model M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 is fully explanatory if the
following condition is fulfilled. Let ϕ be a formula with no free individual variables, but with constants
from the domain of the model. Let w ∈ W . If for every v ∈ W such that wRv, M, v  ϕ, then there
is a justification term t ∈ TermJ such that M, w  t:Xϕ, where X is the set of domain constants
appearing in ϕ.
Theorem 8.5. Let CS be a variant closed and axiomatically appropriate constant specification. The
canonical model of FOLPb using CS is fully explanatory.
Proof. Let M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a canonical model, Γ ∈ W , ϕ a closed Henkin formula and X the
set of the witness variables occurring ϕ. We shall show that ifM,Γ 6 t:Xϕ for every justification term
t ∈ TermJ , then there is a ∆ ∈ W such that ΓR∆ and M,∆ 6 ϕ.
If M,Γ 6 t :Xϕ for every justification term t ∈ TermJ then by the Truth Lemma, ¬t :Xϕ ∈ Γ
for every justification term t ∈ TermJ . The template G(p) = p is a disjunctive template. Let
F (p) = G(p). Then J¬F (ϕ)K ⊆ Γ, and so, trivially, Γ ∪ J¬F (~ϕ)K is CS(V)-consistent. By item
2. of Proposition 6.11, Γ# ∪ J¬G(ϕ)K is CS(V)-consistent, i.e., Γ# ∪ {¬ϕ} is CS(V)-consistent. By
Proposition 6.14, Γ# admits instantiation, and then by Lemma 7.3, Γ# ∪ {¬ϕ} admits instantiation.
By Proposition 7.4, there is a CS(V)-maximal consistent set ∆ such that ∆ admits instantiation and
Γ# ∪ {¬ϕ} ⊆ ∆. Since Γ# ⊆ ∆, ΓR∆. And since ¬ϕ ∈ ∆, by the Truth Lemma, M,∆ 6 ϕ. 
9 The Case Of First-Order JT45
The definitions and results for first-order JT45 (FOJT45) follow with little change from the ones related
to FOLPb. There are only a few minor details that need to be addressed.
On the syntactic side there are two differences. First, propositional JT45 expands the language of
LP by adding the unary justification term ?, and this also happens in the first-order case; an axiom
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B6 for ? is added. Second, b is not a primitive justification term of FOJT45, and consequently the
axiom Bb is dropped. Here is the axiom that is added.
B6 ¬t:Xϕ→?t:X¬t:Xϕ .
In this section, the provability predicates ⊢ and ⊢CS will refer to FOJT45. It is easy to verify that
the Deduction Lemma, the Internalization Theorem and Theorem 2.10 hold for FOJT45.
By an argument due to Prior, one can derive the Barcan Formula in first-order S5. The situation
in FOJT45 is analogous. Fix an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. Then for every term
t a justification term that we may call b(t) can be constructed, playing the role that our primitive term
b(t) played for FOLPb. That is, the Bb formula, ∀yt:Xyϕ(y) → b(t):X∀yϕ(y), is provable in FOJT45
for this defined term b(t).
Proposition 9.1 (Explicit counterpart of the Barcan Formula). Let CS be an axiomatically
appropriate constant specification and y be an individual variable. For every finite set of individ-
ual variables X such that y /∈ X, for every formula ϕ(y) and every justification term t, there is a
justification term b(t) such that ⊢CS ∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ b(t):X∀yϕ(y).
Proof.
1. ∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ t:Xyϕ(y) classical axiom.
2. c1:(∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ t:Xyϕ(y)) constant specification.
3. c1:Xy(∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ t:Xyϕ(y)) from 2 by A3.
4. (∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ t:Xyϕ(y))→ (¬t:Xyϕ(y)→ ¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)) classical axiom.
5. c2:((∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ t:Xyϕ(y))→ (¬t:Xyϕ(y)→ ¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y))) constant specification.
6. c2:Xy((∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ t:Xyϕ(y))→ (¬t:Xyϕ(y)→ ¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y))) from 5 by A3.
7. [c2 · c1]:Xy(¬t:Xyϕ(y)→ ¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)) from 6 and 3 by B2.
8. ?t:Xy¬t:Xyϕ(y)→ [[c2 · c1]·?t]:Xy¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y) from 7 by B2.
9. ¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:Xy¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ¬?t:Xy¬t:Xyϕ(y) from 8 by classical reasoning.
10. ¬?t:Xy¬t:Xyϕ(y)→ ϕ(y) JT45 theorem.
11. ¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:Xy¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ϕ(y) from 9 and 10.
12. [[c2 · c1]·?t]:Xy¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ [[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y) A2.
13. ¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:Xy¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y) from 12 by classical reasoning.
14. ¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ϕ(y) from 11 and 13.
15. ∀y(¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ϕ(y)) generalization.
16. ¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ∀yϕ(y) y /∈ X and classical reasoning.
17. r:(¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ∀yϕ(y)) internalization.
18. r:X(¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ ∀yϕ(y)) from 17 by A3.
19. ?[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ [r·?[[c2 · c1]·?t]]:X∀yϕ(y) from 18 by B2.
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20. ∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→?[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬[[c2 · c1]·?t]:X¬∀yt:Xyϕ(y) JT45 theorem.
21. ∀yt:Xyϕ(y)→ [r·?[[c2 · c1]·?t]]:X∀yϕ(y) from 19 and 20.

Before defining the models for FOJT45 we impose one more condition on the evidence function E .
Definition 9.2 (Strong evidence). LetM = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a Fitting model. We say that E is a
strong evidence function if for every term t and Henkin formula ϕ, E(t, ϕ) ⊆ {w ∈ W | M, w  t:Xϕ};
where X is the set of constants occurring in ϕ.
Definition 9.3. A Fitting model for FOJT45 is a Fitting modelM = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 where 〈W ,R,D〉
is an FOJT45-skeleton (as defined in 3.1); E is a strong evidence function; and the following holds:
? Condition W\E(t, ϕ) ⊆ E(?t,¬t:Xϕ), where X is the set of constants occurring in ϕ.
Theorem 9.4 (Soundness). Let CS be a constant specification. For every formula ϕ ∈ FmlJ , if
⊢CS ϕ, then CS ϕ.
Proof. We will check only the new axiom of FOJT45. Suppose ϕ is an instance of B6, i.e., ϕ is
¬t:Xψ →?t:X¬t:Xψ. For notational simplicity, assume X = {x} and ψ = ψ(x, y). Then we have that
⊢CS ¬t:{x}ψ(x, y)→?t:{x}¬t:{x}ψ(x, y).
Let M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be a Fitting model for FOJT45 meeting CS, w ∈ W and a ∈ D. Suppose
M, w  ¬t:{a}ψ(a, y). Then, M, w 6 t:{a}ψ(a, y). By the definition of the strong evidence function,
w /∈ E(t, ψ(a, y)). By the ? condition, w ∈ E(?t,¬t:{a}ψ(a, y)). Again, by the strong evidence function
M, w ?t:{a}¬t:{a}ψ(a, y). 
The argument for the Completeness Theorem is developed essentially as before. Let a canonical
model M = 〈W ,R,D, I, E〉 be defined essentially as in Definition 8.1, except that now the underlying
logic is FOJT45. There are only a few new features of M that we need to show: R should be an
equivalence relation and E should be a strong evidence function that satisfies the ? Condition.
R is symmetric. Let Γ,∆ ∈ W . Suppose that ΓR∆ but it is not the case that ∆RΓ. We derive
a contradiction.
By our assumptions, Γ# ⊆ ∆ but ∆# * Γ. From the latter, for some term t, set of witness variables
X and Henkin formula ϕ(~y), t:Xϕ(~y) ∈ ∆ but ∀~yϕ(~y) /∈ Γ.
Suppose we had that t:Xϕ(~y) ∈ Γ. Then by repeated use of axiom B5, gen~y:X∀~yϕ(~y) ∈ Γ, and by
axiom B1, ∀~yϕ(~y) ∈ Γ, a contradiction. Hence, t:Xϕ(~y) /∈ Γ.
By what we have just shown, and the maximal consistency of Γ, ¬t:Xϕ(~y) ∈ Γ. By axiom B6,
?t:X¬t:Xϕ(~y) ∈ Γ. Since Γ
# ⊆ ∆, then ¬t:Xϕ(~y) ∈ ∆, and we have a contradiction. Therefore, if
ΓR∆, then ∆RΓ.
? Condition. Suppose Γ ∈ W\E(t, ϕ). Then by definition of E , t:Xϕ /∈ Γ, where X is the set of
all witness variables occurring in ϕ. By the maximal consistency of Γ, ¬t:Xϕ ∈ Γ, and by the axiom
B6, ?t:X¬t:Xϕ ∈ Γ. Hence, Γ ∈ E(?t,¬t:Xϕ).
Strong Evidence. Using the Truth Lemma, we have the following chain of implications:
Γ ∈ E(t, ϕ)⇒ t:Xϕ ∈ Γ⇒M,Γ  t:Xϕ⇒ Γ ∈ {∆ ∈ W | M,∆  t:Xϕ} .
Thus, E is an strong evidence function.
And so the theorems of the previous section can be carried over to FOJT45.
Theorem 9.5 (Completeness for FOJT45). Let CS be a variant closed and axiomatically appro-
priate constant specification. For every closed formula ϕ ∈ FmlJ , if CS ϕ, then ⊢CS ϕ.
Theorem 9.6. Let CS be a variant closed and axiomatically appropriate constant specification. The
canonical model of FOJT45 using CS is fully explanatory.
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10 Future Work
There is both a constructive and a non-constructive proof of the Realization Theorem for first-order
LP. The constructive one uses a cut-free sequent calculus [3], and the non-constructive one uses the
Model Existence Theorem [7]. How to adapt these methods successfully to FOLPb and FOJT45 will
be the subject of further exploration. The Completeness Theorem presented here should be a useful
tool in this endeavor.
One more remark is worth mentioning. In [4] Kit Fine showed that the Interpolation Theorem fails
for constant domain first-order modal logic. The reason for this failure is understood to be a lack of
expressiveness of the quantified modal logic. With hybrid logic we have an example of an extension of
modal logic that can be used to repair this theorem [1], and thus it is natural to ask if the novelties
introduced by justification logic are expressive enough to restore the Interpolation Theorem.
Craig’s Interpolation Theorem could be formulated for FOLPb, perhaps as follows.
The Interpolation Theorem holds for FOLPb iff for every constant specification CS and sentences
ϕ and ψ, if ⊢CS ϕ → ψ, then there is a formula θ such that ⊢CS ϕ → θ, ⊢CS θ → ψ and the
non-logical symbols and the justification terms that occur in θ occur both in ϕ and ψ.
Among the systems studied by Fine is constant domain first-order S4 (FOS4b). As the reader
can easily verify, if the Realization Theorem holds between FOLPb and FOS4b, then it follows that the
Interpolation Theorem fails for FOLPb. Investigation of the Realization Theorem for FOLPb can also
reveal something of the expressive power of justification logic; hence this topic is not only a subject of
interest to the researchers involved in justification logic, but is also a topic of interest for the broader
modal logic community.
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